Does Employment Quota Explain Occupational Choice Among Disadvantaged Groups? A Natural Experiment from India by Prakash, Nishith & Howard, Larry
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does Employment Quota Explain
Occupational Choice Among
Disadvantaged Groups? A Natural
Experiment from India
Nishith Prakash and Larry Howard
Ohio University, California State University Fullerton
29. November 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13573/
MPRA Paper No. 13573, posted 22. February 2009 02:27 UTC
Does Employment Quota Explain Occupational
Choice Among Disadvantaged Groups? A Natural
Experiment from India
Larry L. Howard 1 and Nishith Prakash2, 3
This Draft: November 2008
Running title: Employment quota and occupational choice
1Department of Economics, California State University, Fullerton, P.O Box 6848, Fullerton, CA,
92834 USA. e-mail: larryhoward@fullerton.edu.
2Address for correspondence: Nishith Prakash, Department of Economics, Ohio University, Athens,
OH 45701 USA. e-mail: prakashn@ohio.edu; Telephone: 1-740-593-2051; Fax: 1-740-593-0181.
3We thank officials at the Government of India Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, and
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commissioner’s office in New Delhi, India for data provision
and discussion. Please do not cite without author’s prior permission. We are responsible for any errors
that may remain.
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of a federally-mandated public sector employment quota
policy for minorities on their occupational choice. We utilize multiple logit models to esti-
mate the effect of the policy on the choice between a high, middle, or low-skill public sector
occupation during the 1980s and 1990s. The main findings are, first, the policy has a signifi-
cant effect on the choice of occupation for both groups. The policy increases the probability
of the scheduled caste group choosing high-skill occupations and decreases the probability
of choosing middle-skill occupations. In contrast, the policy decreases the probability of
the scheduled tribe group choosing high-skill occupations and increases their probability of
choosing low-skill occupations. Second, the influence of the policy is interrelated with an
individual’s years of schooling. Third, we find evidence of employment quota externalities in
that a policy targeted at one group affects the occupational choice of the other group. Over-
all, the results suggest that federally-mandated employment quotas do change occupational
choice for the target disadvantaged groups and contribute to their improved socio-economic
standing.
JEL classification: J62, J61, J24, O10, O2.
Keywords: Occupational choice, Skill, Caste, India.
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1 Introduction
Analyzing the impact of federally-mandated public sector employment quotas on
the occupational choice of disadvantaged groups has received remarkably little attention
in the literature. This research takes a first step towards assessing the extent to which
India’s federal policy of mandating state governments to reserve a certain percentage
of all job vacancies for historically disadvantaged minorities has changed the composi-
tion of public sector employment during the 1980s and 1990s for the targeted groups.
Economists have long been concerned with studying the observable factors influencing
occupational choice due to its strong potential to affect socio-economic status of an in-
dividual.1 While quantifying the effect of occupational choice on individual economic
prosperity is important, there has also been an interest in understanding the factors
affecting an individual’s choice of occupation. Driver (1962) and more recently Tsuka-
hara (2007), for example, identify the effect of family background on the occupational
choice of children. Soopramanien and Geraint (2001) estimate the effect of gender on
participation and occupational choice in the U.S. Iannelli (2002) study differences in the
extent to which social origin affects young people’s educational and occupational out-
comes in the European Union countries. Similarly, Constant and Zimmermann (2003)
analyze the contrast in the occupational choice of native and non-native Germans.
In this paper we provide the first estimates of the role that federally-mandated
employment quotas have in shaping the occupational choice for two of India’s largest
minority populations, the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe.2 The policy of
setting employment quotas is, in general, used by the government and other institutions
to help historically disadvantaged sections of society. The primary objective of this
kind of policy is to compensate for past discrimination and subsequently increase their
economic prosperity. Some economists have even suggested that ‘the occupational
attainment of an individual will be a major determinant of their level of consumption,
self-esteem, and their general status in society’, (Harper and Haq, 1997). Given the
importance of an individual’s occupational status in shaping future socio-economic
status, it is interesting to analyze the effect of a large federally-mandated employment
quota policy on the occupational choice of the individuals around which the policy is
1(Tsukahara, 2007); (Maxwell, 1996); (Becker, May, 1962); (Driver, 1962).
2India’s employment based affirmative action policy is arguably the worlds largest federally-
mandated policy in both its nature and coverage.
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designed.
Identifying the effect of federally-mandated employment quotas can be difficult be-
cause whether or how the quotas are determined is likely to be endogenous. One can
easily imagine a scenario where institutions or places that have higher employment
quotas for minorities are likely to favor them in other ways too, which potentially
confounds the interpretation of estimated coefficients for a regression of occupational
choice on levels of employment quota.3 In the case of India, the way in which the
federally-mandated employment quota policy is implemented facilitates the identifica-
tion of its causal effect. In particular, the Indian Constitution stipulates that in each
state the public sector employment quotas targeted at the Scheduled Caste group and
the Scheduled Tribe group– the two principal historically disadvantaged populations
in India– be equal to their respective shares of the state’s total population in the most
recently tabulated census of population. This policy rule generates variation in employ-
ment quota levels, which is plausibly exogenous to states, permitting the identification
of the causal effect of employment quota levels on occupational choice. We account
for intercensal fluctuations in minority population shares in order to avoid confound-
ing the effect of the policy with other state-level changes likely to be correlated with
occupational choice. It is erroneous to expect a minority population’s share to only
affect occupational choice through the federally-mandated employment quota policy.
Instead, our identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that the employment
quota levels set for the minority groups can only change with a time lag with respect
to their respective current population shares. The lag generated by the policy rule
allows us to separately identify the effect of employment quotas from the effect of
contemporaneous changes in their population levels.
In this paper we propose to analyze the patterns of occupational choice using mul-
tiple logit models using gender, educational attainment, and age as individual-level
explanatory variables (Schmidt and Strauss, 1975), as well as a number of relevant
characteristics of the states in which these individuals reside and are employed. To
estimate the models we use individual-level data from multiple rounds of the National
Sample Survey (NSS) of India for the year 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999, respectively
(India, Government of, 1983-2000).4 Our model does not require us to make an assump-
3For a detailed discussion on the issue of identification see Prakash (2008).
4(India, Election Comission of, 1981-2000); (India, Government of, 1983-2000); (India, Census of,
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tion about an appropriate reference point (such as average educational attainment).
Instead, one of the the key advantages is that we can use individual level observations
for the econometric analysis as opposed to percentages. Additionally, the multiple
logit model is attractive, in that, it is consistent with notions of random utility max-
imization, easy to specify and straightforward to estimate using standard maximum
likelihood procedures.5
Our main findings indicate that the occupational choice of individuals belonging to
the target disadvantaged groups is responsive to the federally-mandated employment
quota policy. Estimation of the effect of employment quota levels on occupational
choice in India should be of interest for a number of reasons. First, we are not aware of
any previous study which rigorously quantifies the role of this policy in shaping occu-
pational choice. Yet, this is the largest federally-mandated employment quota policy
in the world, and has existed for over a half century. Second, this paper contributes
to the literature concerned with understanding the factors that have an affect on indi-
vidual occupational choice. Finally, in the context of development, we show that the
optimal design and implementation of affirmative action policies is likely to be complex
as the economic incentives created by employment quota policies are interrelated with
individual education.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
related literature on occupational choice, while Section 3 provides background infor-
mation on disadvantaged minorities and the employment quota policy in India. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data used in our analysis and Section 5 presents the empirical
framework we use for our estimation. We report the main findings of our study in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses the importance of our findings
for understanding how federally-mandated employment quotas affect the occupational
choice of historically disadvantaged groups.
1981-1991); (India, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commision of, 1981-2000).
5(Brown et al., 2008); (Constant and Zimmermann, 2003); (Harper and Haq, 1997); (Connolly
et al., 1992); (Filer, 1986); ; (McFadden and Tye, 1981); (Boskin, 1974); (McFadden, 1973).
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2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on factors that determine the occupational
choice of an individual. The majority of previous studies on occupational choice focus
on the neoclassical capital theory (Becker, May, 1962). Schmidt and Strauss (1975)
study the occupational choice of workers in the U.S. by education, experience, race and
gender. They find that race and gender have strong effects in determining occupational
choice, and interpret this result as evidence which is suggestive of labor market dis-
crimination. Constant and Zimmermann (2003) using multiple logit models examine
the occupational choice behavior of male and female Germans, native Germans and
immigrants. They find that gender significantly and differentially affects occupational
choice, and that individuals with more education choose higher ranking jobs. Addi-
tionally, they find that immigrants’ occupational choice is more influenced by their
mothers’s education and not by their fathers’ education. A number of researchers have
modeled occupational choice and estimated various factors influencing it. They have
linked occupational choice to family backgrounds, race, caste, gender, etc. Most of the
research is centered on analyzing the occupational choice of individuals in developed
countries.
To our knowledge this study is the first to rigorously quantify the effects of pub-
lic sector employment quota levels in India on the occupational choice of minorities.
The results put forth here contribute to the literature by providing yet another factor
influencing the occupational choice of an individual. Galanter (1984) provide a good
qualitative discussion of the Indian employment quota policy. Some of the recent stud-
ies have also examined the effects of the political reservation policy in India. Pande
(2003) find that changing the political representation for the Scheduled Caste group
and the Scheduled Tribe group impact policy choices, which is consistent with policy
preferences differing across social groups and politicians acting upon their constituent’s
preferences. Prakash (2007) find that the political reservation policy for minorities has
reduced overall poverty in India. Additionally, Prakash (2008) find that federally-
mandated public sector employment quotas for minorities have a significant effect on
their labor market outcomes such as the probability of finding a salaried job. Thus,
federally-mandated policies like employment quotas and political reservation appear to
have a beneficial effect for the group for whom the policies are targeted. It is of natural
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interest to examine if such polices also have an effect on the occupational choice of the
minorities in India.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Disadvantaged Minorities in India
The Indian constitution explicitly recognizes Scheduled Castes (SCs)6 and Sched-
uled Tribes (STs)7 as the two principal historically disadvantaged minority groups in
India, previously known as the depressed classes.8 They together account for 24.4 per-
cent of the total population according to 2001 census.9 The SCs, who make up 16.4
percent of the total population, are comprised of groups isolated and disadvantaged
by their “untouchability” status.10 The word “untouchability” refers to their low status
in the traditional Hindu caste hierarchy which exposed them to invidious treatment,
severe disabilities, and deprivation of economic, social, cultural, and political opportu-
nities (Galanter 1984). The STs, who make up 7.9 percent of the total population, are
distinguished by “tribal characteristics” and by their spatial and cultural isolation from
rest of the population. In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, the identity
of SCs and STs is historically determined. An individual is born as a member of the
SC group or ST group and cannot change his/her caste over their lifetime.11
The SCs and STs in India do much worse off as compared to the non-minorities.
6Selection criteria for Scheduled Castes: 1. Cannot be served by clean Brahmans; 2. Cannot be
served by barbers, water-carriers, tailors, etc who serve the caste Hindu; 3. Pollutes a high-caste
Hindu by contact or by proximity; 4. Is one from whose hands a caste Hindu cannot take water; 5.
Is debarred from using public amenities, such as roads, ferries, wells or schools; 6. Is debarred from
the use of Temples (place of worship); 7. Will not be treated as an equal by high-caste men of the
same educational qualification in ordinary social intercourse; 8. Is merely depressed on account of its
own ignorance, illiteracy or poverty and, but for that, would be subject to no social disability; 9. Is
depressed on account of the occupation followed and whether, but for that, occupation it would be
subject to no social disability.
7Selection criteria for Scheduled Tribes: 1. Tribal origin; 2. Primitive way of life and habitation
in remote and less accessible areas; 3. General backwardness in all respects.
8Some SCs in India are also known as Dalits and some ST people are also known as Adivasis.
9The criteria for the selection of “scheduled castes” and “scheduled tribes” groups as stated in
Constitutional orders of 1950.
10The Indian Constitution prohibits the use of the word untouchability.
11The word caste or ‘jati’ is derived from the word ‘jan’, ‘to be born’ and indeed the jatis are
endogamous: one is born in the caste one’s parents belong to; they are organized in a hierarchical way
due to their status, given in terms of ritual purity, according to a continuum ranging from Brahmins
to the Untouchables.
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Their poverty rate as measured by a headcount ratio is twice as high as the non-
minorities. Specifically, the percentage of people below the poverty line is 48.3 for the
SCs and 52 for the STs, while only 31.2 percent of non-minorities are reported to be
poor. Similarly, their literacy rate is by far the lowest. Less than 30 percent are reported
to be literate among the STs, while this number is only marginally higher for the SCs.
The infant mortality rate for the SC group is 118 while for the ST group it is 121
compared to 80 among the non-SC/ST population. This systematic deprivation across
all spheres has been the impetus for many government policies aimed at helping the
SCs and STs. Among these policies is the federally-mandated public sector employment
quota policy.
3.2 The Natural Experiment in India
The early traces of this employment quota policy for disadvantaged minorities in
public sector jobs go back to the early 1930s, under the British rule. Under the same
spirit and concern, this policy found a place when the Constitution of India was being
drafted after its independence in 1947 and its transition to a sovereign republic in
1950. Specifically, Articles 16(4)12, 320(4) and 335 of the Indian Constitution provide
safeguards for SCs and STs in services and posts under the state with a view to ensuring
their adequate representation in public sector jobs. The percentage of reservation in
services/posts under the state government varies from one state to another and is fixed
on the basis of the percentage of SC and ST population relative to the total population
in the respective state.13 This policy of official discrimination in favor of the worst-off
sections of the population is unique in the world, both in the range of benefits involved
and in magnitude of the groups eligible for the benefits.
The National Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commission handles the ad-
ministration of the employment quota policy in India. The National Commission on
SC and ST has a vigorous statutory mandate and the powers of a civil court.14 This
12Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the State, is
not adequately represented in the services under the State.
13Annual Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commissioners Report.
14Under Article 338 of the Constitution, the President of India appoints a special officer known
as the commissioner for SC and ST to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided
for the SC and ST under the various provisions of the Constitution. In 1990, through the sixty-fifth
amendment of the Constitution(Article 338) the special officer was replaced by a National Commission
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Commission co-ordinates between the state government and the federal government
once the recent census population estimates by social group arrive. Before implement-
ing the recommendation by the Commission approval from several bodies is required.
After the new estimates arrive, the Commission revises the percent of jobs reserved
for SCs and STs according to the new census population estimates. Next, the Com-
mission sends the recommendation to the President of India. Then, the Ministry of
Social Justice and Empowerment places the recommendation before both houses of the
Parliament which gives the final approval. Only after this set of administrative steps
is the percent of jobs reserved revised to reflect the new census population estimates.
The details of how the employment quota policy is implemented in India will enable
us to identify the effects of this policy.
4 The data
The empirical analysis uses data assembled from a variety of sources. This section
gives a brief summary of the data sources and the variables used; Appendix A provides
a detailed account of the same.
The primary source is the National Sample Survey (NSS). This provides a large,
nationally representative sample of households in India. We use data from the Employ-
ment and Unemployment rounds of this survey in 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999. From
the NSS, we extract the following sample: individuals who are currently aged 18-65,
living in one of the 16 major Indian states named in Appendix A, and not currently
attending school. This restriction is because the employment quota variables that we
cover in these states over the 1983-1999 time period are consistent; at any rate, it
should have minimal impact since these 16 states account for over 95 percent of the
Indian population. All the occupation outcomes and individual demographic variables
used in the empirical paper come from the NSS.
The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Annual Commissioner’s Report provides
the policy variables for each state and year: employment quota for SCs and employment
quota for STs. These policy variables are merged into the NSS individual-level data
set by state and year.
for SC and ST with powers of a civil court to summon persons, files, etc. for securing evidence on
oath.
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The remaining data sources are as follows. The Census of India, Registrar General
provides the data on SC and ST census population shares and current population
shares. The Census Atlas, India provides population density data. Finally, state per
capita income is from the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation. These
data are at the state-year level, and merged into the NSS data set by state and year.
5 Estimation framework
To analyze the effect of the federally-mandated public sector employment quota
policy on individual occupational choice we utilize the multinomial logit model (MNL)
specified in equation (1):
Pr(Yi = j) =
eβ
′
jXi∑3
k=1 e
β′kXi
j = 1, 2, 3 (1)
where i indexes each individual in the sample and j indexes the realized choice Yi
between low, middle, and high-skill public sector occupations, respectively. We restrict
our sample to individuals not currently attending school who are age 18-60 and living
in one of the sixteen major Indian states.15 We estimate our model separately for each
group for the year 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999 using maximum likelihood estimation
procedures available through Stata.
Occupations are defined by the Indian National Classification of Occupations codes
and we classify these according to skill level.16 Each occupation in the public sector
requires a passing score on an entrance examination; we assume that the higher the
skill required for the occupation the more difficult the entrance exam. High-skilled oc-
cupations include positions such as teachers, administrative and executive government
officials, as well as directors and managers of financial institutions. Middle-skill occupa-
tions include positions such as book keepers, office assistants, nurses and other medical
and health technicians. Low-skill occupations include positions such as electricians,
equipment operators, and individuals performing construction and other maintenance
related services.
15The states represented in our sample are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana,
Jammu-Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala,Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,Rajasthan,
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
16See Appendix A for the details of the classification used here.
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The vector of explanatory variables X includes individual characteristics as well as
characteristics of the states in which the individuals reside and are employed. The in-
dividual characteristics include age, the square of age, gender, and years of schooling.17
The state characteristics include the federally-mandated percentage of all public sector
jobs in a state required to be allocated to each of the respective minority groups. In
addition, we include the current population shares of each of the minority groups, the
fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 to 60, the population
density of the state, and the natural log of per capita state income lagged one year.18
Identification requires a normalization of the coefficients and intercept to zero for
one choice of occupation and we normalize relative to the middle-skill alternative. Test
statistics are calculated following Small and Hsiao (1985) to assess whether the assump-
tion that the ratio of probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of
the third choice.19 In the literature this is known as the “independence of irrelevant
alternatives” property and is the primary limitation of the MNL modeling approach.
Departures from this assumption imply inconsistent parameter estimates in that omit-
ted attributes of alternative occupations are plausibly correlated with the binary choice
outcome of interest.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
The sample means of state characteristics for 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999 are re-
ported in Table 1. Mean values of both the Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe
(ST) employment quotas have slightly increased over the sample period from about
16% and 8% to 17% and 9%, respectively. The federal strictures of the employment
quota policy require the group-specific quotas to be based on their respective popula-
tion shares in census years. Accordingly, we see that the mean population shares of
17Years of schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary
school, 10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for a graduate
studies.
18Table 1 summarizes the state characteristics and Table 2 summarizes the individual level data.
Appendix A contains a detailed description of data sources and the construction of variables utilized
in the model.
19We gratefully acknowledge Nick Winter for writing the Stata module which calculates the test
developed by Small and Hsiao (1985).
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SCs and STs, respectively, are slightly different from the mean level of employment
quotas in each year. This variation is stimulated by intercensal population changes
in each of the minority groups. These changes allow us to identify the effect of the
employment quota policy independently of other general population changes within
states which might also impact occupational choice. Lastly, the mean values of per
capita state income rise over the years in our sample while the percentage of public
sector employees between the ages of 55 and 60 have remained at around 78%. There
is an upper age limit of forty years imposed on potential applicants for public sector
occupations and once employed in the public sector individuals typically remain there
until retirement at age 60. The consistency of this measure across years suggests there
are no major differences in the public sector hiring process over this time period.
The sample means of individual characteristics for 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999 are
reported in Table 2. These individuals belong to the SC and ST groups, are age 18-60,
not attending school, and are employed in either a high, middle, or low-skill public
sector occupation. The percentage of both SC and ST individuals employed in high-
skill occupations has steadily increased over the sample period while the percentage
employed in low-skill occupations has declined. In contrast, the percentage of both SC
and ST individuals employed in middle-skill occupations has remained fairly constant,
with perhaps a small increase by 1999. Over 80% of public sector employees belonging
to the SC and ST groups are male and the average age is about 36 years old.
One interesting distinction between the two groups is in terms of years of schooling.
For both the SC and ST groups we see that mean education levels have increased over
the sample period by about 5 years, on average. However, individuals belonging to
the SC group have education levels considerably lower relative to individuals in the ST
group. One explanation for this disparity is perhaps a higher utilization of informal
schooling among the SC group relative to the ST group. We further explore the possi-
bility that the employment quota policy might have differential effects on occupational
choice depending on schooling levels. Finally, the sampling process utilized in the In-
dian National Sample Survey has changed somewhat over the sample period analyzed
here. In particular, we have a much smaller sample of public sector employees belong-
ing to the SC and ST groups for round 55 in 1999. We hypothesize that changes in
the sampling distribution underly the failure of our tests of independence of irrelevant
alternative for a few of the years, and we return to this issue below.
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6.2 The effect of the employment quota policy on the occu-
pational choice of the SC group
Table 3, 4, and 5 present the main findings of the effect of the federally-mandated
employment quota policy on individual occupational choice for the SC group. These
tables show the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of
choosing an occupation which is high, middle, or low-skill, and are evaluated at the
sample mean values.20 We see that, in general, the SC employment quota policy
increases the probability of SC individuals choosing high-skill occupations and lowers
the probability of choosing middle-skill occupations. The effect on the probability of
choosing a low-skill occupation is positive, but not statistically different from zero for
any year.
It is not surprising that we find a significant positive effect of years of schooling on
the probability of choosing high and middle-skill occupations and a significant negative
effect on the probability of choosing low-skill occupations across all years. Interestingly,
however, we also see that the effect of the employment quota policy is interrelated with
individual years of schooling. The results in Table 3 suggest the higher educated
individuals in the SC group are more responsive to the employment quota policy. In
particular, we find that those with more education are even more likely to choose high-
skill occupations in states which have higher quotas, and this is also true for middle-skill
occupations. This suggests a differential effect of the policy for individuals with and
without schooling, which is not always in the same direction.
In terms of the validity of our modeling approach, Table 6 provides assurance that
our estimated marginal effects are not biased by our choice of normalization. Here we
see that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of independent irrelevant alternatives for all
but one subset of choices for 1999. These tests imply that our choice of normalization is
appropriate in this context. The fact that the sample size of SC public sector employees
falls by more than half in 1999 is suggestive of potential issues of representativeness in
SC sampling for that survey round. Furthermore, the fraction of predictions implied
by our model that were in fact correct is high and 70% or greater for all years.
20The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients from the MNL model in equation (1) do not
have straightforward interpretations because they measure the change in the log odds ratio between
two alternatives due to a unit change in an explanatory variable. For brevity, we do not report these
results here and these results are available from the authors upon request.
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6.3 The effect of the employment quota policy on the occu-
pational choice of the ST group
Table 7, 8, and 9 present the main findings of the effect of the federally-mandated
employment quota policy on individual occupational choice for the ST group. These
tables show the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of
choosing an occupation which is high, middle, or low-skill, and are evaluated at the
sample mean values.21 We see that, in general, the ST employment quota policy
increases the probability of ST individuals choosing low-skill occupations and lowers
the probability of choosing high-skill occupations. The effect on the probability of
choosing a middle-skill occupation is generally small and positive, but not statistically
different from zero for any year except 1994. For this year, in particular, we find the
assumptions of our modeling approach are not met and therefore we place little weight
on the interpretation of estimates for this year.
As with the SC group, we find a significant positive effect of years of schooling on
the probability of choosing high and middle-skill occupations and a significant negative
effect on the probability of choosing low-skill occupations across all years. However,
in this case, we find less evidence that the effect of the employment quota policy is
interrelated with individual years of schooling. The results in Table 7 suggest the higher
educated individuals in the ST group are even more likely choose high-skill occupations
in states which have higher quotas, despite the negative mean effect of the policy. In
contrast, those with more schooling are less likely to choose middle-skill occupations,
however, the effect is only weakly significant in 1999. Again, we find evidence that
suggests the effect of the policy between individuals with and without schooling is not
always in the same direction.
In terms of the validity of our modeling approach, Table 10 provides assurance that
our estimated marginal effects are not biased by our choice of normalization in 1988
and 1999 only. Here we see that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of independent
irrelevant alternatives for all but one subset of choices for these years, but do reject
both null hypotheses for 1983 and one for 1994. Furthermore, the fraction of predictions
21The maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients from the MNL model in equation (1) do not
have straightforward interpretations because they measure the change in the log odds ratio between
two alternatives due to a unit change in an explanatory variable. For brevity, we do not report these
results here and these results are available from the authors upon request.
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implied by our model that were in fact correct is still high at 60% or greater for all
years in our sample period of 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999, but relatively lower compared
to those for the SC group.
7 Discussion
In this study we have applied the multiple logit model and employed data from
various sources to predict occupational choice among the two historically disadvan-
taged groups in India. Methodologically, we have been careful to test the validity of
this approach, given our choice of normalization. Our primary underlying assumption
is that individuals choosing between public sector occupations which require high or
middle-skill levels do not respond to occupational attributes specific to alternative low-
skill occupations. Similarly, those choosing between occupations which require low or
middle-skill levels are not responsive to attributes of alternative high-skill occupations.
Overall, the results suggest that this policy has a significant effect on the choice of
occupation for both of the groups.
Specifically we find that the SC employment quota policy increases the probability
of SC individuals choosing high-skilled occupations. Also, we find a significant posi-
tive effect of years of schooling on the probability of choosing a high and middle-skill
occupation and a significant negative effect on the probability of choosing a low-skilled
occupation across all of the years we analyze. In contrast, for the ST group, we find
that the ST employment quota policy increases the probability of choosing a low skilled
occupation and lowers the probability of choosing a high-skill occupation. This result is
perhaps not very surprising because the majority of ST individuals are located where
only low skilled jobs are available. Also, in general, minorities with more years of
schooling have better opportunities elsewhere.
From a policy perspective our results provide evidence of significant changes in
the composition of occupations among the two target disadvantaged minority groups.
We reveal a possible mechanism through which the policy is working and find it is
interdependent with schooling levels. These findings are particularly important if we
believe that occupational choice is correlated with socio-economic standing in society.
Here, we see that schooling levels are a strong predictor of occupational choice, however,
we also see that individuals with more schooling are more responsive to the policy.
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So to one extent we can attribute part of the improved socio-economic condition
of the SC and ST groups to the employment quota policy. Some caution, however, is
required in considering the optimal design and implementation of employment quota
policies from a development standpoint. We find evidence of policy externalities, in this
context, which is suggestive of inter-group competition for public sector occupations.
Specifically, we see that individuals belonging to the SC group are more likely to choose
middle-skill occupations in states which have higher levels of ST employment quotas,
while the opposite is true for low-skill occupations. One explanation for this finding
is that individuals belonging to the ST group typically live in relatively isolated areas
where only low-skill jobs are available. Thus, despite the fact that ST individuals have
higher education levels, on average, it might be the case that fewer of these individuals
are located near areas requiring the services of middle-skill occupations. Moreover,
we find that individuals belonging to the ST group are more likely to choose high-skill
occupations in states which have higher levels of SC employment quotas. This suggests
the responsiveness of target disadvantaged groups to employment quota policies might
depend on the spatial distribution of employment opportunities relative to minority
location within states. It is particularly important to keep this in mind if policymakers
intend to change the magnitude of the effect of this policy. More research along these
lines would likely prove informative for understanding how employment quotas change
the economic incentives for minority groups.
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Table 1: The sample means of selected state characteristics in India1
1983 1988 1994 1999
Scheduled Caste (SC) employment quota 16.0 15.9 16.6 16.5
(5.1) (5.1) (5.7) (5.7)
Scheduled Tribe (ST) employment quota 8.1 8.4 9.4 8.8
(5.9) (6.0) (7.0) (6.6)
SC current population share 15.9 16.1 17.1 17.8
(5.8) (5.7) (5.6) (5.6)
ST current population share 8.1 8.4 8.6 8.2
(7.4) (7.4) (7.8) (7.4)
Population density 267.2 262.5 264.9 262.7
(143.6) (146.1) (148.4) (143.9)
% of public sector employees age 55-60 81.3 78.2 76.9 78.6
(3.2) (3.5) (4.2) (3.8)
Ln(per capita income) lagged one year 7.0 7.10 10.7 11.0
(0.3) (0.3) (0.6) (0.6)
Note: Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
Sources: Quota data are obtained from the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Annual Commissioner’s
Report (1955-2000); current population share and population density data are from the Census of India,
Registrar General data; public sector employee data are from the Indian National Sample Survey rounds
38, 43, 50, and 55; state per capita income data are based on domestic product of states of India
prepared by the Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation.
1The states represented in our sample are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu-
Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala,Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu,
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
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Table 2: The sample means of selected public sector employee characteristics for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe groups
Scheduled Caste Scheduled Tribe
1983 1988 1994 1999 1983 1988 1994 1999
% High-skill occupation 6.6 10.1 11.1 12.3 15.3 18.2 25.0 26.1
% Middle-skill occupation 23.4 23.8 23.9 24.4 26.1 27.3 27.6 30.2
% Low-skill occupation 70.0 66.1 65.0 63.3 58.6 54.5 47.4 43.7
% Male 84 84 85 85 88 84 83 85
Age 35.5 36.4 36.4 37.5 35.0 35.4 36.2 36.7
(10.7) (10.5) (10.4) (10.8) (10.2) (10.2) (9.7) (9.9)
Years of schooling 1.3 1.8 5.0 5.6 2.0 2.5 6.7 7.3
(2.9) (3.5) (5.6) (5.9) (3.4) (3.8) (6.1) (6.10)
Number of observations 7507 7992 6519 3396 1986 2803 1947 1038
Note: Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
Source: Indian National Sample Survey rounds 38, 43, 50, and 55 for the year 1983, 1988, 1994, and 1999, respectively.
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Table 3: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and school-
ing on the probability of choosing a high-skill occupation for the Scheduled
Caste group1
High-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
ST Employment Quota 0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0018 −0.0028
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0036)
SC Employment Quota 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0054 0.0063 −0.0003
(0.0016) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0050)
Schooling x SC Employment Quota 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0002∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Schooling3 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0074) (0.0025) (0.0059)
Male −0.0476∗∗∗ −0.1417∗∗∗ −0.1185∗∗∗ −0.1462∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0322) (0.0191) (0.0239)
Number of observations 7507 7992 6519 3396
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2High-skilled occupations include positions such as teachers, administrative and executive government
officials, as well as directors and managers of financial institutions.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 4: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and schooling
on the probability of choosing a middle-skill occupation for the Scheduled
Caste group1
Middle-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
ST Employment Quota −0.0014 −0.0028 0.0209∗∗ 0.0008
(0.0079) (0.0065) (0.0086) (0.0116)
SC Employment Quota −0.0020 −0.0189∗∗ −0.0296∗∗∗ −0.0214∗
(0.0050) (0.0077) (0.0108) (0.0111)
Schooling x SC Employment Quota 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0008∗ 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Schooling3 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0225∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0164) (0.0068) (0.0080)
Male 0.0971∗∗∗ 0.1059∗∗∗ −0.0384 −0.0518∗
(0.0326) (0.0331) (0.0259) (0.0279)
Number of observations 7507 7992 6519 3396
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2Middle-skill occupations include positions such as book keepers, office assistants, nurses and other
medical and health technicians.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 5: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and school-
ing on the probability of choosing a low-skill occupation for the Scheduled
Caste group1
Low-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
ST Employment Quota 0.0011 0.0033 −0.0191∗∗ 0.0020
(0.0083) (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0126)
SC Employment Quota −0.0030 0.0134 0.0233 0.0217
(0.0053) (0.0122) (0.0148) (0.0143)
Schooling x SC Employment Quota −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0021∗ −0.0010∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Schooling3 −0.0612∗∗∗ −0.0734∗∗∗ −0.0312∗∗∗ −0.0334∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0206) (0.0051) (0.0111)
Male −0.0495 0.0358 0.1569∗∗∗ 0.1980∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0470) (0.0323) (0.0417)
Number of observations 7507 7992 6519 3396
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2Low-skill occupations include positions such as electricians, equipment operators, and individuals
performing construction and other maintenance related services.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 6: The Chi-square statistics testing the null hypothesis of independence of ir-
relevant alternatives and the percentage of the observations the model cor-
rectly predicts for the Scheduled Caste group1
1983 1988 1994 1999
χ2 test that the choice of high vs. middle-skill 6.24 13.05 13.68 11.85
occupation is independent of low-skill attributes [0.937] [0.444] [0.397] [0.540]
χ2 test that the choice of middle vs. low-skill 12.76 18.81 6.29 20.04∗
occupation is independent of high-skill attributes [0.466] [0.129] [0.935] [0.094]
% correct predictions 76 75 72 70
Number of observations 7507 7992 6519 3396
Note: P-values are in brackets.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1The test statistics are Chi-square distributed with 13 degrees of freedom; the test is developed
in Small and Hsiao (1985) and is robust to correlation of observations within states.
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Table 7: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and school-
ing on the probability of choosing a high-skill occupation for the Scheduled
Tribe group1
High-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
SC Employment Quota −0.0001 0.0082 0.0193 0.0382∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0088) (0.0186) (0.0085)
ST Employment Quota −0.0252∗∗∗ −0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0107 −0.0342∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0186) (0.0105)
Schooling x ST Employment Quota −0.0006 −0.0001 −0.0002 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Schooling3 0.0448∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0051) (0.0043)
Male −0.1306∗∗∗ −0.3392∗∗∗ −0.3304∗∗∗ −0.3884∗∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0531) (0.0471) (0.0593)
Number of observations 1986 2803 1947 1038
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2High-skilled occupations include positions such as teachers, administrative and executive government
officials, as well as directors and managers of financial institutions.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 8: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and schooling
on the probability of choosing a middle-skill occupation for the Scheduled
Tribe group1
Middle-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
SC Employment Quota 0.0006 0.0064 0.0065 −0.0246∗
(0.0114) (0.0097) (0.0220) (0.0147)
ST Employment Quota −0.0007 −0.0008 0.0926∗∗∗ −0.0154
(0.0147) (0.0089) (0.0140) (0.0116)
Schooling x ST Employment Quota 0.0001 −0.0011 0.0004 −0.0008∗
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Schooling3 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0156) (0.0055) (0.0078)
Male 0.0665∗ 0.1038∗ 0.0006 −0.0170
(0.0382) (0.0595) (0.0332) (0.0518)
Number of observations 1986 2803 1947 1038
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2Middle-skill occupations include positions such as book keepers, office assistants, nurses and other
medical and health technicians.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 9: The predicted marginal effects of employment quotas, gender, and schooling
on the probability of choosing a low-skill occupation for the Scheduled Tribe
group1
Low-Skill Occupation2
1983 1988 1994 1999
SC Employment Quota −0.0005 −0.0146 −0.0258 −0.0136
(0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0319) (0.0147)
ST Employment Quota 0.0259 0.0200∗∗ −0.1033∗∗∗ 0.0497∗∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0092) (0.0198) (0.0124)
Schooling x ST Employment Quota 0.0005 0.0012 −0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Schooling3 −0.1048∗∗∗ −0.1367∗∗∗ −0.0684∗∗∗ −0.0511∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0202) (0.0037) (0.0060)
Male 0.0641 0.2355∗∗∗ 0.3298∗∗∗ 0.4055∗∗∗
(0.0487) (0.0623) (0.0463) (0.0245)
Number of observations 1986 2803 1947 1038
Note: Reported standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means and based on coefficient estimates from multinomial
regression models which also include additional explanatory variables measuring individual age, the square
of age, the state’s current population share of the Scheduled Caste group, the state’s current population
share of the Scheduled Tribe group, the fraction of a state’s public sector employment which is age 55 or
older, the population density of the state, and the ln(per capita state income) lagged one year.
2Low-skill occupations include positions such as electricians, equipment operators, and individuals
performing construction and other maintenance related services.
3Schooling is computed by assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school,
10 years for secondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate studies.
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Table 10: The Chi-square statistics testing the null hypothesis of independence of
irrelevant alternatives and the percentage of the observations the model
correctly predicts for the Scheduled Tribe group1
1983 1988 1994 1999
χ2 test that the choice of high vs. middle-skill 29.37∗∗∗ 11.29 24.74∗∗ 12.09
occupation is independent of low-skill attributes [0.006] [0.587] [0.025] [0.521]
χ2 test that the choice of middle vs. low-skill 23.92∗∗ 14.19 19.02 5.34
occupation is independent of high-skill attributes [0.032] [0.360] [0.123] [0.967]
% correct predictions 68 69 67 62
Number of observations 1986 2803 1947 1038
Note: P-values are in brackets.
* Significant at 10-percent level,** Significant at 5-percent level, and *** Significant at 1-percent level.
1The test statistics are Chi-square distributed with 13 degrees of freedom; the test is developed
in Small and Hsiao (1985) and is robust to correlation of observations within states.
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Appendix A
Data Sources and Construction of Variables
This paper builds on a wide variety of data sources. The data source used in
this paper covers sixteen main Indian states from the period 1983-1999 unless men-
tioned otherwise. These states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana,
Jammu-Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The outcome variables and
individual level control variables comes from the National Sample Survey (NSS) rounds
conducted in 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1999. These are large quinquennial surveys that
covered the Employment and Unemployment rounds. The Employment and Unemploy-
ment round of NSS is the only survey that collects information on individual’s earning
and labor market characteristics for the entire India. Each survey collects information
on approximately 120,000 households and over half a million individuals. The policy
variables comes from the Annual Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Commissioner’s
Report (1955-2000). NSS is an individual-level data while my policy variables are at
state-time level. These policy variables are merged into the NSS individual-level data
by state and year.
Outcome Variables
Occupation
The occupation outcomes are constructed using NSS Employment and Unemployment
rounds as defined by the Indian National Classification of Occupations. From the NSS,
we extract the following sample: individuals who are currently aged 18-65, living in
one of the 16 major Indian states, and not currently attending school. This paper uses
three occupation categories defined as follows:
-Low Skill : This outcome variable is constructed using the Indian National Classifica-
tion of Occupations. The low skilled occupation consists of service workers (building
caretakers, sweepers, cleaners and related workers, protective service workers), pro-
duction and related workers (miners, quarryman, well drillers and related workers,
machinery fitters, machine assemblers and precision instrument makers, electric fitters
and related electrician and electronic workers, and transport equipment operators).
-Middle Skill : The middle skill occupation consists of nursing and other medical and
health technicians, clerical and other supervisors, village officials, book keepers, cashiers
and related workers, clerical and related workers, transport and communication super-
visors, transport conductors and guards, and telephone and telegraph operators.
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-High Skill : The high skill occupation consists of teachers, jurists, administrative and
executive officials government and local bodies, directors and managers, and financial
institutions.
Policy and Control Variables
Employment quota
This paper uses the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Annual Commissioner’s
Report (1955-2000) for the employment quota variables for SCs and STs. The institu-
tional details for the Employment Quota policy also comes from this report. This is
a state level data available for the period 1955-1999. The employment quota variables
are “Employment Quota for SC” and “Employment Quota for ST” and is denoted as
“SC Employment Quota” and “ST Employment Quota”.
-Employment Quota for SC(ST): defined as total number of jobs reserved for SC(ST)
in public sector divided by total number of new jobs advertised in the state in a specific
year.
Population data
This paper uses Census of India, Registrar General data from 1981-2001. The data
series has been interpolated for inter-censal years. I use “SC (ST) current population
share” which is the interpolated SC (ST) population share from the census as measured
in the current year. Population density is computed as the ratio of interpolated total
population data from the census as measured when reservation was determined in the
state divided by total land area of the state, as reported in the Census Atlas, India.
This variable is also updated according to the two conditions described above.
-SC (or ST) Current population share: defined as population count of SC (or ST) in a
state divided by total population count in that state in the current year.
-Census population density : defined as interpolated total population count from the
census as measured when reservation was determined divided by total land area in a
state.
Individual Characteristics from the NSS
The individual level controls for this paper is extracted from the NSS. They are an
individual’s age, gender, caste, and marital status. Years of school is computed by
assigning 0 years for no formal education, 5 years for primary school, 10 years for sec-
ondary school, 12 years for high secondary school and 16 years for graduate degree.
Fraction of elderly people in public sector employment
The variable is constructed using NSS rounds. This is the total number of people
between age 55-60 in the public sector employment divided by total public sector em-
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ployment time 100. This variable captures across state variation in share of elderly
people in public sector job. If there are higher share of such people then this could
have a direct effect on potential vacancy in public sector employment.
State Domestic Product
State domestic product is the log of real per capita state income. The data source
is: Domestic Product of States of India from 1983 to 2000 prepared by Economic and
Political Weekly Research Foundation.
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